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LITIGATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES IN
OKLAHOMA: THE AFTERMATH OF HIPAA
MELISSA A. COUCH*

L Introduction
The enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA)1 dramatically changed the way in which attorneys obtain
medical information, especially in personal injury and medical malpractice
cases. Attorneys in every state have faced challenges in obtaining "protected
2
health information" (PHI) as defined by HIPAA, and Oklahoma has been no
exception. Before the enactment of HIPAA, most states had laws in place
governing access to a patient's medical information and its use in litigation.
Because HIPAA is a federal regulation, however, it preempts many of these
state laws.3
The legislative purpose of HIPAA, which is also known as the "Privacy
Rule," is to protect patients' privacy by limiting a third party's access to a
patient's medical information.4 Although the goal of protecting patient
privacy regarding medical records is certainly important, HIPAA fails to
address how attorneys obtain relevant health information on patients who have
filed lawsuits placing their medical condition in issue.
Arguably, plaintiffs' attorneys who have filed lawsuits placing clients'
medical conditions in issue have greater access to medical information than
defense attorneys because plaintiffs' counsel can easily obtain medical
authorizations from their clients. Further, a plaintiffs attorney may
communicate freely with her client regarding the plaintiff s medical care and

* Associate, Short, Wiggins, Margo & Butts, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. B.A.,
University of Oklahoma, 1999; J.D., Oklahoma City University, 2002. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-.104 (2003). HIPAA regulations were effective on April 14,
2001, but full compliance with HIPAA was not mandated until April 14, 2003. See United
States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2002 WL 31819130, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 12,
2002).
2. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
3. Generally, federal law preempts state law when state law contradicts federal law.
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, section 160.203(b) of HIPAA
defers to state law where the state regulations provide greater privacy protection than HIPAA.
45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b); see also infra Part III.
4. See Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608,611-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003).
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treatment and may even contact the plaintiff's treating physician to discuss
care before filing the lawsuit.
In Oklahoma, until the enactment of HIPAA, defense counsel used title 76,
section 19, which governs patient medical records.' Section 19 allowed
defense attorneys to obtain medical information upon the filing of a lawsuit
without the patient's prior medical authorization.6 After using section 19 for
over a quarter of a century in litigating medical malpractice cases, attorneys
in Oklahoma are attempting to determine the impact of HIPAA on informal
methods of obtaining medical information, such as the procedures permitted
under section 19 and Oklahoma case law.7 While the general goal of HIPAA
did not focus on the accessibility of medical records to attorneys litigating
personal injury claims, HIPAA regulations certainly will influence counsels'
accepted methods of gathering medical information in Oklahoma.
In construing the standards set forth under HIPAA and section 19, this
Article argues that the two statutes are not in conflict. Part 11 of this Article
discusses title 76, section 19 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Part I1 then analyzes
HIPAA's effect on section 19. Finally, Part IV addresses HIPAA's impact on
informal discovery methods used under section 19, including ex parte
communications between counsel and treating physicians. This Article
ultimately concludes that section 19 may still be used to obtain medical
information while maintaining compliance with HIPAA's privacy
requirements.

5. 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19 (2001). Pursuant to section 19, in cases involving personal injury
or death filed against a health care provider, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived any
physician-patient privilege provided by law by placing her medical condition in issue. Id. Thus,
attorneys may obtain medical information for purposes of litigation even absent a medical
authorization signed by the patient. Id.; see also Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir.
1991).
6. See 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19.
7. Section 19 is one of the less restrictive statutes in the country, allowing not only access
to medical records, but also the ability to communicate with treating physicians through
informal discovery. Compare, e.g., Seaberg v. Lockard, 1990 OK 49, 800 P.2d 230, with
Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2004). The permissive nature
of Oklahoma's statute has been a topic of contention in courts across the country. See Conning
the IADC Newsletters, 71 DEF. CouNs. J. 199,208 (2004); John Jennings, Note, The PhysicianPatient Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiffs
TreatingPhysiciansandDefense Counsel, 59 Mo. L. REV. 441,454, n.77 (1994); J. Christopher
Smith, Recognizing the Split: The JurisdictionalTreatment of Defense Counsel's Ex-Parte
Contact with Plaintiff's Treating Physician, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 247, 252-55 (1998-99).
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I.Oklahoma's Statute: Title 76, Section 19
Section 19 has two general purposes. First, section 19(A) provides patients
with open access to their own medical records as maintained by their health
care provider.8 Second, section 19(B) waives a patient's privacy privilege
regarding medical information when the patient has made a claim against a
9
health care provider placing her physical or mental condition in issue.
Section 19 provides an inexpensive and efficient method for attorneys to
0
obtain medical records and information in order to prepare their case.'
Absent section 19, defense attorneys would be effectively unable to prepare
a defense; a plaintiff s attorney investigating a potential medical malpractice
claim might also be hampered if she were denied access to records. Thus, for
Oklahoma medical malpractice attorneys and litigants, section 19 is an
important and valuable tool.
III. HIPAA 's Impact and Effect on Section 19(B)
A. HIPAA's Requirements
Although Congress did not necessarily intend HIPAA to prevent counsel
from obtaining a plaintiff's medical information," HIPAA's strict guidelines
require Oklahoma lawyers to reexamine their use of section 19(B) in gathering
medical information. The pertinent language in the federal regulation permits
disclosure of PHI (1) "in the course of any judicial or administrative
proceeding"; (2) "in response to an order of a court"; or (3) "in response to a
subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process .... HIPAA further

8. 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(A). Patients can obtain copies of their medical records at the
statutory rate. Id. The statute, however, specifically limits a patient's access to psychological
or psychiatric records, which are both governed under a separate statute. Id. § 19(A)(3).
9. Id. § 19(B). The subject of the lawsuit must be a claim arising out of patient care by
the defendant health care provider, including actions brought on behalf of a deceased patient.
The statute specifically states that the patient "shall be deemed to waive any privilege granted
by law concerning any communication made to a physician or health care provider with
reference to any physical or mental condition .. " Id. § 19(B)(1). Although such information
is accessible and discoverable under the statute, it must be material and relevant to an issue in
litigation before being admitted into evidence in any proceeding. Id.
10. See id. § 19(B).
11. See Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003); June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Commercial Use of Protected Health Information Under
HIPAA 's PrivacyRule: ReasonableDisclosureorDisguisedMarketing?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 741,
742-43 (2004) (discussing the various reasons why Congress enacted HIPAA).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i),(ii) (2003).
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requires that attorneys provide both notice to the patient whose medical
information is being sought and reasonable assurances that the information
will be used only for purposes of litigation and will be returned or destroyed
at the conclusion of the lawsuit. 3
Before HIPAA, attorneys in Oklahoma could request medical records from
any health care provider by letter, attaching a copy of the petition and a copy
of section 19(B). 4 Health care providers rarely refused these informal
requests.15 However, under HIPAA, more is now required for counsel seeking
copies of medical records.
HIPAA's guidelines do not greatly affect plaintiffs' attorneys because they
can simply have their clients sign HIPAA-compliant authorizations for release
of records.' 6 But defense counsel who do not have informal access to the
plaintiff can no longer obtain medical records inexpensively or efficiently.
After HIPAA, defense counsel must wait for the plaintiff to supply HIPAAcompliant medical authorizations before obtaining records that are central to
issues in the lawsuit, which ultimately creates delays in the initial
development of the defendant's case. 7

13. See id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A),(B). Specifically, the party seeking the PHI should obtain
a "qualified protective order," which is an order from the court restricting the use and disclosure
of medical information obtained for litigation, and requiring its return or destruction at the end
of the case. See id. § 164.512(e)(1)(v). For all practical purposes, this may be accomplished
in Oklahoma by showing the court that the plaintiff has placed her medical condition in issue.
See 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B)(1).
14. See 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B).
15. But see id. § 19(A)(3). Health care providers only refused these requests if the attorney
was seeking records concerning psychological or psychiatric care. Id. Pursuant to section
19(A)(3), not even a patient is entitled to copies of their mental health records absent the health
care provider's consent or court order. Id. The statute permits disclosure of mental health
records as outlined in title 43A, section 1-109 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1109 (2001). Section 1-109 states that a patient can personally access their mental health records
unless disclosure is "reasonably likely" to endanger the patient's life or the life of another. Id.
Presumably, the health care provider would be in the best position to make that determination,
which may explain why section 19(A)(3) does not cover access to mental health records. See
76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(A)(3).
16. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)-(2). HIPAA sets forth various types of acceptable
authorizations based on the purpose of the request. Generally, the authorization must include
a specific description of information being sought (such as the date of treatment and complaint),
the name of the person(s) making the request, the name of the person(s) or entity entitled to
disclosure, a description of the purpose of the request, an expiration date (typically the
conclusion of litigation), and the signature of the patient or authorized representative. Id.
§ 164.508(c)(1). Further, the authorization must contain language providing the patient with
notice of her right to revoke the authorization. Id. § 164.508(c)(2).
17. One of the advantages of section 19(B) over HIPAA is the attorney's ability to make
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B. Oklahoma'sRequest for an Exception Determination
Because HIPAA is a federal regulation and federal laws preempt conflicting
state laws,' 8 many commentators initially thought that HIPAA would render
section 19(B) useless as a tool for obtaining medical information. 9 Realizing
the impact that HIPAA would have on litigating medical malpractice cases in
Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Medical Association and the Oklahoma
Hospital Association petitioned the Department of Health and Human
Services for an exception from the application of the Privacy Rule adopted
under HIPAA.2° Title 45, section 160.203 of the Code of Federal Regulations
authorized the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to
grant an exception, 2' and the Secretary delegated the responsibility of making
exception determinations to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).22 In a lengthy
letter, the OCR clarified its position on HIPAA' s impact on section 19(B) and
determined that the Oklahoma statute was not in conflict with the Privacy
Rule and was therefore not preempted.23
The OCR letter stated that preemption occurs when state law is contrary to
federal law.24 Under section 160.202 of the federal regulations, provisions of
law are contrary on two conditions. 25 First, state law is contrary to HIPAA if
a health care provider "would find it impossible to comply with both state and
federal [law]." 26 Alternatively, a state law would be contrary if it posed an
obstacle to the goals of the Privacy Rule.27 If neither condition is met, an

an immediate request for medical records upon the filing of a lawsuit without having to wait for
signed authorizations from the patient. See 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B). Although records from
the defendant health care provider could be easily obtained by defense counsel upon the filing
of a lawsuit, records from subsequent treating physicians are not as simple to gather.
18. Meyer v. Conlon, 162 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998).
19. See Letter from Richard M. Campanelli, J.D., Director of Office for Civil Rights to
W.F. Phelps, M.D., President of Oklahoma State Medical Association, and Craig W. Jones,
FACHE, President of Oklahoma Hospital Association at 1 (June 24, 2003) (on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review) [hereinafter Campanelli Letter].
20. Id. (stating that the requested exception involved 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)-(vi)).
21. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a) (authorizing exceptions to the general rule where such is
necessary to, among other things, preserve "a compelling need related to public health, safety,
or welfare..." and if it is determined "that the intrusion into privacy is warranted when
").
balanced against the need to be served ....
22. Campanelli Letter, supra note 19, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 160.202(2).
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exception determination is not warranted, and HIPAA will not preempt state
law. 28 After considering each of these conditions, the OCR determined that
an exception was not necessary in Oklahoma.2 9
1. The Impossibility Test
The OCR termed the first condition "The Impossibility Test. 3 ° Under this
test, the OCR must determine whether a health care provider would violate
either section 19(B) or HIPAA if it complied with the other.31 In medical
malpractice cases, both state and federal law permit disclosure of PHI. 2
Section 19(B) authorizes disclosure through waiver of the physician-patient
privilege,33 whereas HIPAA requires notice and reasonable efforts to obtain
a qualified protective order. 34 Because section 19(B) does not compel
disclosure of PHI, it is not in conflict with HIPAA. 3' Thus, a health care
provider can comply with section 19(B) in a manner that does not make it
impossible to comply with HIPAA.
2. The Obstacle Test
Under the alternative condition, the OCR recognized that section 19(B)
does not impede the objectives of HIPAA.36 The OCR defined the purpose of
HIPAA as "improv[ing] the Medicare and Medicaid programs and 'the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the
development of a health information system through the establishment of
standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health
information.' 37 It is difficult to ascertain how section 19(B) could be an
obstacle to this objective. Accordingly, it appears an exception is not
necessary under "The Obstacle Test."
C. HIPAA Compliance Still Required
Despite OCR's letter finding that section 19 is not contrary to HIPAA, a
health care provider must still comply with HIPAA unless the state law
28. See id. § 160.202(1).
29. See generally Campanelli Letter, supra note 19.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B) (2001). In other words, the statute prohibits a patient from
claiming the privilege in an effort to impede the release of medical records.
34. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2003).
35. Campanelli Letter, supra note 19, at 4-5.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 261).
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relating to patient privacy of health information is "more stringent" than
HIPAA.35 Thus, while HLPAA does not render section 19(B) useless because
the Oklahoma statute is not contrary to HIPAA,3 9 health care providers must
still comply with HIPAA's notice and reasonable assurance requirements
unless section 19 is "more stringent" than HIPAA.4°
Although no Oklahoma court has decided whether section 19 is more
stringent than HIPAA, cases interpreting other state statutes provide guidance
on this issue. In contrast to Oklahoma, Illinois recognizes a strict medical
records privilege whereby even redacted medical records cannot be disclosed
in judicial proceedings. In NorthwesternMemorial Hospital v. Ashcroft,42
the government subpoenaed medical records from the hospital, requesting
records of certain patients on whom a doctor had performed late-term
abortions.4 3 The central issue on appeal was whether the trial court' s quashing
of the subpoena under HIPAA was appropriate." The government argued that
HIPAA authorized the disclosure of these medical records because all
information identifying the individual would be redacted, thereby removing
any privacy concerns.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the trial court's decision but declined to apply HIPAA. Rather, the
appellate court based its decision on Illinois' strong policy of privacy for
medical records. 46 Arguably, the court declined to apply HIPAA because

38. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. In other words, if a state passes a law regarding accessibility of
PlI that is more protective of a patient's right to privacy, the state law is applicable and not
preempted.
39. See infra Part III.B.
40. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(l)(ii)(A),(B) (requiring that the party seeking PHI provide
both notice to the patient whose medical information is being sought and reasonable assurances
that the information will be used only for purposes of litigation and will be returned or
destroyed at the conclusion of the lawsuit).
41. See N.W. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2004).
42. 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
43. Id. at 924. The suit challenged the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 925.
46. Id. at 932-33. The case was brought in federal court involving a federal question. The
Seventh Circuit determined that patients, physicians, and hospitals relied on the policy of
heightened protection of privacy in Illinois, but recognized it may not be applicable in federal
proceedings concerning federal question issues. See id. The court turned to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45(c), which allows a subpoena to be quashed if it imposes an undue burden
on the person or entity subject to the subpoena, and used it as a basis for its decision. Id.
HIPAA clearly authorizes disclosure of medical records when the medical records do not
identify the individual, and there is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be
used to identify the patient. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2003). The Seventh Circuit's decision is a
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federal law expressly allows for the disclosure of records that have been "deidentified '4 7 and does not comport with Illinois' strict medical privilege.4 8
An appellate court in Florida similarly found Florida's state law regarding
disclosure of PHI more stringent than the requirements established by the
Privacy Rule.49 Although the court concluded that HIPAA's procedural
requirements for disclosure were more stringent than those of Florida because
of notice requirements to the patient, the court determined that the substantive
provisions of the Florida law were more stringent because disclosure of PHI
was restricted to entities falling within four statutory exceptions, and not "any
third party" as allowed under HLPAA.50 Accordingly, the court found
Florida's law concerning release of PHI more stringent and therefore
controlling in Florida cases. 5'
In determining whether a state law is "more stringent" than HIPAA, courts
consider the extent to which a patient's privacy and ability to control
disclosure of records is protected.52 Some have taken the "more stringent" test
to the extreme and have argued that state laws mandating disclosure of
medical records are "more stringent" than HIPAA's permissive rule, which
authorizes disclosure of PHI where certain guidelines are met.53 However,
states with laws concerning disclosure of PHI that are more stringent than
HIPAA seem to be in the minority, and few cases have held that HIPAA does
not preempt state law on this basis.
Indeed, with patient control over the disclosure of PHI being the primary
consideration in determining whether a state law is more stringent, state
statutes, like Oklahoma's section 19, that mandate disclosure of medical
records without the patient's consent or notice are not likely to meet the "more
stringent" test. Under section 19(B), the plaintiff's consent for disclosure of
medical information is inferred when the plaintiff files the lawsuit, which does

classic example of an outcome-oriented opinion because the court quashed the subpoena under
the guise of federal law when state law was the true basis for denying the government's request.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514.
48. N.W.Mem'IHosp., 362 F.3d at 925.
49. See Lemieux v. Tandem Health Care, Inc., 862 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2003).
50. Id. at 748 n.1.
51. Id.
52. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004); Smith v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
53. See Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 709-11. Maryland's law regarding disclosure of medical
records requires a health care provider to furnish medical records without patient authorization
where the patient has filed a civil action and the care and treatment are the main issues in the
case. Id. at 709.
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not appear to satisfy the notice and control requirements of HlPAA 4
Although no court has published an opinion regarding section 19's
compatibility with HIPAA, based on the construction of the "more stringent"
test for other state statutes, it appears unlikely that a court would find section
19 "more stringent" than the requirements of HIPAA.
IV. The Ultimate Challenge: Ex Parte Communications
Because section 19 is probably not "more stringent" than HIPAA, HIPAA
may limit informal discovery methods authorized under the Oklahoma statute.
Before HIPAA, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants had the ability to
informally confer with treating physicians concerning the care and treatment
of the plaintiff once the plaintiff filed a lawsuit placing her medical condition
in issue." Section 19 granted access to both plaintiff's and defense counsel
to communicate ex parte with the treating physicians, who essentially became
fact witnesses in the malpractice action. 6 Not only could physicians discuss
their care of the patient, they could also offer opinions on the cause of the
patient's complaints." This informal discovery method provided an efficient
and inexpensive process for obtaining medical information without patient
authorization, subpoena, or court order, ultimately conserving judicial time
and saving attorneys' fees. With the enactment of HIPAA, however, the
concern became whether contact with the plaintiff's physicians could occur
absent the plaintiff's explicit consent.
A. Seaberg v. Lockard
HIPAA created an uneven playing field for attorneys litigating medical
malpractice cases, whereby plaintiffs counsel can conduct informal
interviews with treating physicians, but the defendant's representatives need
the plaintiffs explicit consent to engage in such communications. PreHIPAA, health care providers were comfortable releasing and discussing
medical information pursuant to section 19(B) with attorneys on both sides.
Post-HIPAA, more was needed to demonstrate to health care providers that
their disclosure of PHI did not violate HIPAA.
For example, in 1990, before the enactment of HIPAA, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court considered the issue of ex parte communication by counsel

54. See id. at711n.l.
55. Seaberg v. Lockard, 1990 OK 40, 800 P.2d 230.
56. Id. 1 3, 800 P.2d at 231-32. Communication occurred on the basis of the plaintiff
waiving her physician-patient privilege under section 19(B). Id.
57. Id. 6, 800 P.2d at 232.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:827

with a plaintiffs treating physician.58 In Seaberg v. Lockard 9 the court
addressed whether waiver of the physician-patient privilege under section
19(B) contemplated a district court's order authorizing or directing health care
providers to participate in ex parte communications with defense counsel.6"
The court determined that the law permits voluntary ex parte communications
with physicians where no legal privilege exists, but does not provide judicial
authority for facilitating or impeding such communications.6 '
Seaberg supported defense counsels' practice of conducting ex parte
communications with treating physicians. At the time Seaberg was decided,
Oklahoma law allowed informal interviews to occur through section 19(B) which was deemed self-executing - and there was no reason for the court to
contemplate the need for an order specifically authorizing disclosure of
medical information.
B. ConstruingSeaberg After HIPAA
Based on HIPAA's requirement that health care providers could disclose
62
PHI in the course of any judicial proceeding or in response to a court order,
defense counsel began the practice of requesting court orders, stating that the
plaintiffs had waived their physician-patient privilege under section 19(B) by
filing a malpractice action, and that health care providers could disclose PHI
through requests for production of medical records or informal interviews.
Plaintiff's counsel frequently objected to these requests, arguing that Seaberg
specifically held that a court cannot order health care providers to conduct ex
parte communications.6 3 In fact, the holding in Seabergprovided that "neither
statute nor case law prohibits the legal representatives of a defendant from
conducting voluntary ex parte interviews with a plaintiffs prospective
medical witness, butjudicial action may not be invoked to facilitate or impede

58. Id. 2, 800 P.2d at 231. Although some courts distinguish a treating physician who is
at the time treating the patient and a treating physician who treated the patient in the past,
Oklahoma does not. See 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B) (2001). Rather, any physician who has ever
treated the patient is considered a "treating physician."
59. 1990 OK 40, 800 P.2d 230.
60. Id. 2, 800 P.2d at 231.
61. Id. 6, 800 P.2d at 232.
62. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2003).
63. Although no Oklahoma court has published an opinion discussing the applicability of
Seaberg in light of HIPAA, defense counsel working in medical malpractice have met frequent
challenges when seeking court orders authorizing the disclosure of PHI by arguing Seaberg's
application.
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informal interviews. ' In other words, ex parte communications can only
occur voluntarily by willing health care providers.65
The OCR's letter illustrating its position on the use of section 19(B) in light
of HIPAA supports this common practice. Oklahoma attorneys in medical
malpractice litigation generally file a pleading with the court at the outset of
the lawsuit notifying the plaintiff of counsel's intent to obtain PHI by any
means necessary, including requesting records and conducting informal ex
parte communication with treating physicians. This practice satisfies
HIPAA' s notice requirements, but still affords defense counsel the opportunity
to take advantage of informal discovery methods authorized by section 19(B).
More importantly, this practice allows health care providers to disclose PHI
without fear of violating the Privacy Rule.
C. Considerationby Other States
Oklahoma is not the only state faced with the issue of whether informal
practices authorized by state law are restricted in light of HIPAA. Maryland,
for instance, does not prohibit ex parte communication between a lawyer and
the treating physician of an adverse party who placed her medical condition
in issue.6 6 One Maryland court stated that HIPAA regulations "radically
changed the landscape of how litigators can conduct informal discovery in
cases involving medical treatment."67 The court further instructed counsel to
"be far more cautious" in their contacts with medical fact witnesses to ensure
compliance with HIPAA.6s Nonetheless, the court recognized three methods
counsel could use in conducting informal interviews while maintaining
compliance with HIPAA.6 9
First, counsel could obtain a court order allowing disclosure of PHI by the
health care provider.7" Second, title 45, section 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A) of the
Code of Federal Regulations authorizes disclosure of PHI in response to a

64. Seaberg 1 3, 800 P.2d at 232.
65. The important language is that the court can neither "facilitate nor impede" ex parte
communications. If the court were to order health care providers to engage in ex parte
communications, it would be facilitating informal interviews. Certainly, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court would not force physicians to engage in ex parte communications concerning a patients'
care and treatment for obvious public policy reasons. Conversely, if the court were to order the
parties not to engage in ex parte communications, it would be impeding informal interviews.
Under Seaberg, neither is authorized. See id.
66. See Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705,711 (D. Md. 2004).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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"lawful process" if the health care provider receives satisfactory assurances
that counsel has made reasonable efforts to provide notice to the plaintiff of
the request for disclosure.7 ' Third, section 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B) of the federal
regulations authorizes disclosure in response to a "lawful process" if counsel
gives assurances that the defendant has made reasonable efforts to obtain a
qualified protective order.72 According to the court, the use of any of these
methods are acceptable in conducting ex parte communications.73
The term "lawful process" is not defined in HIPAA. One logical
interpretation would include the informal discovery methods sanctioned by
section 19(B), such as informal interviews with treating physicians.
Apparently, the Maryland court considered "lawful process" to encompass ex
parte communication. 74 The Maryland court concluded that while HIPAA
preempted Maryland's law regarding informal interviews, compliance with
HIPAA could be maintained while still taking advantage of the state's less
stringent law.75
A New Jersey court adopted a different approach in analyzing HIPAA's
effect on the state's permissive authorization of informal interviews in medical
malpractice cases.76 New Jersey has both statutory and case law authority
allowing ex parte communications with a plaintiff's treating physician.7 7 The
court found that HIPAA does not expressly address informal discovery
methods and, therefore, state law should govern informal discovery.7 8 Still,
the court recognized the "burgeoning importance" of protecting patient
privacy and determined that some adjustments would need to be made to
ensure compliance with HIPAA.79 Although the court did not elaborate on the
adjustments, it acknowledged the burden placed on health care providers who
are willing to engage in informal interviews but are reluctant for fear of
breaching their fiduciary duties to their patient or being sanctioned for
violating HIPAA.8 °

71.
72.
73.
74.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A) (2003).
Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B).
Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
Id.

75. Id.
76. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
77. Id. at 612.
78. Id. at 622. The court stated that it was unaware of any intent by Congress to interfere
with a state law concerning ex parte communications, and that HIPAA's objectives were not
inconsistent with such informal interviews. ld.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id. The court noted that health care providers could be forced to consult with counsel
before disclosing medical information, creating additional costs for the health care provider.
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Other courts have taken the opposite approach to HIPAA' s effect on states'
informal discovery practices. Because HIPAA does not define "other lawful
process," courts have held that only formal discovery requirements satisfy the
Therefore, HIPAA prohibits ex parte
requirements of HIPAA.
communications. 81 This analysis, however, fails to consider the broad scope
of HIPAA and focuses only on a small section of the regulation. Further, it
ignores Congress's objectives in implementing the regulation.
Clearly, many states have struggled with the impact of HIPAA on state
statutes allowing attorneys to use informal discovery methods to obtain
medical information. Despite this, it appears that section 19(B) of the
Oklahoma Statutes is applicable, provided that compliance with the Privacy
Rule - such as notice and reasonable assurances to the patient - is
maintained. Moreover, even though Seaberg was decided before HIPAA, it
remains good law and provides support for ex parte communications under
section 19.
V. Conclusion
In construing HIPAA regulations, it appears that counsel may obtain
medical records and conduct informal interviews so long as: (1) counsel
provides the plaintiff with notice of counsel's intent to obtain PHI and affords
the plaintiff an opportunity to object; 2 (2) the plaintiff receives adequate
assurances that counsel will not use medical information for any other purpose
other than its intended use in litigation;83 and (3) counsel destroys or returns
the plaintiffs medical information at the conclusion of litigation. If these
conditions are met, HIPAA has been satisfied, and health care providers can
be assured that their disclosure of PHI will not violate the federal regulations.
As it stands, section 19(B) is still applicable in Oklahoma and is not
preempted by HIPAA. Oklahoma's practical approach to resolving its state
statute with the requirements of HIPAA is a model for other states with
similar laws.

Id. The court also commented that insurance companies are now offering health care providers
insurance for potential HIPAA violations. Id. at 626 n. 13.
81. Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1026-27 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
82. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A) (2003). Under section 19(B), a plaintiff's objection
will likely be overruled unless medical information being sought does not encompass a medical
condition the plaintiff has placed in issue. 76 OKLA. STAT. § 19(B) (2001).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(A).
84. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(B).
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